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ABSTRACT
Since there is a significant demand for obtaining third-party soft Intellectual Property (IP)
by first-party integrated circuit (IC) vendors, it is becoming easier for adversaries to insert
malicious logic known as hardware Trojans into designs. Due to this, vendors need to find ways
to screen the third-party IPs for possible security threats and then mitigate them. The development
of the Structural Checking (SC) tool provides a solution to this issue. This tool analyzes the
structure of an unknown soft IP design and creates a network of all the signals within the design
and how they are connected to each other. In addition, these signals will be assigned with assets.
Assets describe the central role of a signal in the entire design. These assets are then used to create
asset patterns, which will be crucial for this thesis research. Previous research on SC tool focuses
on Trojan detection by comparing and matching an unknown design to a trusted design in a Golden
Reference Library. In this thesis research, another method of Trojan detection has been
implemented in the SC tool, which focuses on recognizing specific asset patterns that mainly exist
in Trojan-infested designs. These specific asset patterns can then be used to check against unknown
designs for Trojans without using a Golden Reference Library. This thesis improves this method
by creating a new framework for easily identifying the unique Trojan asset patterns.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Hardware Trojans can be inserted in different stages of integrated circuit (IC) production. One
stage of IC production that many researchers focus on is the design stage. Nowadays, it is getting
more difficult for an IC vendor to design every IC component in house. Because of this, many
third parties are given the responsibility for designing certain components known as intellectual
properties (IPs). However, an issue that can arise from letting third parties design components is
whether they are trustable. Due to the vast number of such components, malicious logic or
hardware Trojan can be easily hidden in any of the components.
There have been multiple research efforts about Trojan detection in various stages of IC
production. One approach utilizes machine learning to detect hardware Trojans at the registertransfer level [1]. There is also research about detecting Trojans by measuring combinational
delays to check whether the designs got altered [2]. Some researchers [3] used randomizationbased probabilistic techniques to verify the legitimacy of the circuit design.
The Structural Checking Tool (SC Tool) is another research on hardware Trojan Detection.
The SC Tool was first introduced in [4]. Unlike other hardware Trojan detection approaches, the
SC Tool focuses on analyzing the structure of a register-transfer level (RTL) IPs and then matches
against entries in a Golden Reference Library (GRL) to see whether they match a known design
with Trojan or not.
The next chapter of this thesis provides all the relevant background information for the SC
Tool. It provides important details of assets and describes the basic concept of the GRL. Moreover,
this chapter also discusses hardware Trojans that can be inserted during the design phase of IC
production. Chapter 3 proposes an improvement of the tool’s Trojan detection by focusing on the
unique asset pattern method of Trojan detection. Additionally, this chapter introduces three
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Trojans that can be detected using the asset pattern method. Chapter 4 discusses the results of
implementing the detection for the three types of Trojans mentioned in Chapter 3. Lastly, Chapter
5 summarizes the thesis and provides insights on how the research done in this thesis can be
improved.
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Structural Checking Tool
2.1.1 Overview
The goal of the SC tool is to determine whether an unknown design contains hardware
Trojans or not. The tool takes in unknown soft IP designs, such as in VHDL, as inputs, and then
outputs a report regarding its Trojan status determination. The Structural Checking tool consists
of five main steps, i.e., 1) design parsing, 2) asset assignment, 3) asset filtering, 4) matching
analysis, and 5) Trojan detection.
2.1.2 Assets
The concept of assets is an integral part of the Structural Checking tool. Assets were
introduced in [5]. The function of an asset is to describe the primary purpose or contribution of a
signal in a soft IP design. A signal can have multiple purposes; therefore, multiple assets may also
be assigned to the same signal. Depending on the asset type, assets can be manually assigned by
the user or automatically by the tool. In addition, asset assignment for a signal may not be the same
in every design since signals may serve different purposes in other designs. The two major types
of assets are External assets and Internal assets. Moreover, assets are divided into various
categories under each of those major types.
2.1.3 External Assets
An external asset is one of the two major types of assets that are primarily assigned to
describe the contribution of primary port signals of an RTL design. The user of the Structural
Checking tool manually assigns this type of asset. For example, a soft IP design that takes in a
clock signal as one of its primary inputs, that signal can be assigned a SYSTEM TIMING asset.
Currently, there are 75 external assets which are divided into seven categories. The number of
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external assets is expected to increase as more signal roles are identified in the future. A past
version of external assets is listed in [6]. Tables 1-7 contain a list of all the current iterations of
assets divided into their respective categories.
Table 1: Data asset category
_ANY
COMPUTATIONAL
MEMORY

The signal may accept any type of data depending on configuration or
settings.
The signal contributes to the flow of computational data, such as data
used within arithmetic units.
The signal contributes to the flow of memory data.

ENCRYPTION

The signal handles transmission with external components. (ex.
UART)
The signal contains data used within the peripherals of the design. (ex.
Display, Temp, etc.)
The signal contains information about data to be encrypted.

DECRYPTION

The signal contains information about data to be decrypted.

_HASH

The signal contains information about data to be hashed.

DECODING

ADDRESS

The signal contains information about data used within a decoding
process.
The signal contains information about data used within an encoding
process.
The signal controls address used in memory units of the system.

KEY

The signal controls a key within an encryption/decryption unit.

SENSITIVE

TEST_IN

The signal contributes to data that should remain confidential to the
circuit.
The signal contributes to data important to the operation of the circuit
and could cause issues were it to be tampered with.
The TDI (Test Data In) signal of the circuit.

TEST_OUT

The TDO (Test Data Out) signal of the circuit.

COMMUNICATION
PERIPHERAL

ENCODING

CRITICAL
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Table 2: Timing asset category
CLOCK

The signal is the system\'s primary clock

CLOCK_CONTROL

The signal contributes to the control of the system\'s primary
clock
The signal is a subsystem\'s primary clock

SYSTEM_
CLOCK_CONTROL
SUBSYSTEM_
CLOCK_CONTROL
SYSTEM_TIMING

The signal contributes to the control of a subsystem\'s primary
clock

SUBSYSTEM_TIMING

The signal controls timing for the entire system, such as timing
between synchronous components of the circuit
The signal controls timing for a particular subsystem

STATUS

The signal indicates the status of the system

READY

The signal indicates whether or not an operation is ready

DONE

The signal indicates whether or not an operation has finished

BUSY

The signal indicates whether or not an operation is busy

HOLD

The signal indicates whether or not to hold an operation

COUNT

The signal is used as a counter within the design

WAIT

The signal indicates whether or not an operation must wait

STANDBY

The signal indicated an operation with a state of readiness
without being immediately involved
The TCK (Test Clock) signal of the circuit

TEST_CLOCK

Table 3: System Control asset category
ENABLE

The signal controls a structure by enabling its operation

_SET

The signal controls a set operation on part of the circuit

RESET

The signal controls a reset operation on part of the circuit

EXECUTE

The signal controls execution of an operation

READ

The signal controls a read operation

WRITE

The signal controls a write operation

SELECT

The signal controls a select operation

LOAD

The signal controls a load operation
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Table 3 (Cont.)
SHIFT

The signal controls a shift operation

INTERRUPT

The signal controls an interrupt signal

MODE

The signal controls the mode of a data processing block

ACKNOWLEDGE

The signal is used to acknowledge that an event of some sort has
occurred
The signal contributes to communication by way of a handshaking
operation
The signal controls where data will be sent to

HANDSHAKING
DATAFLOW

REQUEST

The signal is used as a flag bit to control the operation of
something
The signal is used for making requests to other modules

TEST_MODE_SELECT

The TMS (Test Mode Select) signal of the circuit

TEST_RESET

The TRST (Test Reset) signal of the circuit

FLAG

Table 4: Specific System Control asset category
INTERRUPT_CONTROL

The signal controls an interrupt unit

PERIPHERAL_CONTROL

The signal controls the peripherals of the design (ex.
Display, Temp, etc.)
The signal controls memory information

MEMORY_CONTROL

The signal controls transmission with external
components (ex. UART)
The signal handles protocol bit from an external
COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL
component (ex. UART)
The signal handles a transmit ready signal from external
COMMUNICATION_STATUS
components (ex. UART)
The signal controls access to a bus
BUS_CONTROL
COMMUNICATION_CONTROL

DUTY_CYCLE

The signal controls duty-cycle-related operations

PHASE

The signal controls phase-related operations

EXCEPTION_HANDLING

The signal handles exceptions within the system

ERROR_HANDLING

The signal handles errors within the system
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Table 5: Instruction Set asset category
INSTRUCTION

This is a generalized instruction asset that should be applied to
signals that don\'t fit a more specific instruction description

OPERAND

This signal is an operand used for an instruction

OPERATION_TYPE

This signal sets the type of operation performed by an
instruction

SOURCE

This signal describes the location of source data for use with
the instruction or is the source data itself

DESTINATION

This signal describes the destination for data output by an
instruction or the destination itself

PROGRAM_COUNTER

The signal manipulates the value within a program counter

BRANCH

This signal is used for branch operations

OFFSET

This signal describes offsets used for instruction decoding,
encoding, and manipulation

PROGRAM_COUNTER_OP

The signal controls change within a program counter

DATA_OP

The signal controls the operation of a unit dealing with data,
such as ALU/Data operations

MEMORY_OP

The signal controls operations of a memory unit

INTERRUPT_OP

The signal controls operations of an interrupt unit

PRIORITY

This signal sets the priority or importance of an instruction

AVAILABILITY

This signal sets the availability stage of an instruction for
bypassing

PIPELINE_CLEAR

This signal clears the instruction pipeline

PIPELINE_LOCK

This signal locks the instruction pipeline
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Table 6: parameter asset category
CONFIGURATION
INITIALIZATION
FREQUENCY
TIMING
PHASE
DATA_WIDTH
GENERATE_CONTROL
ENABLE

This is a more generic asset used for when the
other parameter assets do not fit properly but
another asset is unnecessary
Parameter related to the initialization of some
data structure or component
Parameter that specifies values related to
frequency
Parameter that specifies values related to
timing
Parameter that specifies values related to
phase
Parameter that specifies the data width of
some data structure or component
Parameter that specifies how some generate
statement should operate
Parameter that enables or disables some
feature or features of the design

Table 7: Miscellaneous asset category
COMPONENT

The signal controls components not defined
by other assets

UNKNOWN

Cannot define any asset

UNUSED

The signal is not used in the circuit

2.1.4 Internal Assets
The second primary type of asset is the Internal asset. Internal assets are mainly assigned
to internal signals as opposed to external assets. In addition, most internal assets are automatically
assigned by the tool. However, the tool also allows users to manually set three assets: Observable,
Controllable, and Protected.
Table 8: Assignable internal assets
CONTROLLABLE

The signal controls an FSM

OBSERVABLE

The signal is observable after a scan-in
operation
The signal is protected from known attacks

PROTECTED
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2.1.5 Asset Filtering, Asset Trace, and Asset Pattern
After all assets are assigned to primary port signals and internal signals, the next step for
the tool is asset filtering. In this step, assets assigned to a signal will propagate to every signal it is
connected to. For example, suppose a primary input signal is connected to a primary output signal
through a series of intermediate signals. In that case, all assets assigned for that primary input will
also propagate to the primary output and all the intermediate signals. This allows the tool to
determine how the signals are associated with each other and if they share some similar
functionalities. These assets are saved into an asset trace. An asset trace is a set of assets that were
assigned or filtered into a signal.
An asset pattern is generated by the tool, and it consists of all the asset traces formed within
that design. Asset Pattern consists of six characteristics: input port signal external asset, input port
signal internal asset, output port signal external asset, output port signal internal asset, internal
signal external asset, and internal signal internal asset.
2.1.6 Functionality and Golden Reference Library (GRL)
The formation of an asset pattern is used to approximate the overall functionality of the
unknown design as well as the functionalities of each of its components. The information stored
in the asset pattern will be compared to other asset patterns in each entry in the GRL during
matching analysis, which will be explained later. Suppose there is a GRL entry that matches the
closest to the unknown design. In that case, the functionality of that GRL entry will be given as
the suggested functionality of the unknown design. Currently, there are 18 functionalities in the
Structural Checking Tool, and they are categorized as either Trojan-free or Trojan-infested
functionalities. The main difference between the two is that the Trojan-infested category contains
functionalities that are commonly found in designs with Trojans.
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The Golden Reference Library is a library of trusted and analyzed soft IP designs that are
either Trojan-free or Trojan-infested. Each GRL entry is a single file currently stored as a JSON
file. In addition, A GRL entry contains both the functionalities and the asset pattern of the soft IP
design. The information stored in a GRL entry will be helpful for the matching analysis step.
2.1.7 Golden Reference Matching
Golden reference matching was first developed in [7]. The matching process for the Golden
Reference Library includes algorithms such as basic matching and partial matching. Basic
matching uses each asset characteristic formed from the unknown design’s asset traces and creates
a percentage match against the designs from the GRL. However, since there are assets that might
be associated with or similar to other assets, partial matching is developed to take that into account.
Slightly similar assets can be assigned a 50% match instead of 100%. Statistical matching,
introduced in [8], is developed to create a more accurate percentage match than both basic and
partial matches. Moreover, Champion GRL and Functionality GRL were added in [9], which
further improves the matching accuracy while also making the matching process more efficient in
computational resources.
2.2 Hardware Trojan
2.2.1 Overview
Hardware Trojans can be inserted in various stages of IC design flow. There are many
existing strategies for detecting these Trojans in every stage. However, the Structural Checking
tool only focuses on analyzing hardware Trojans inserted into a design at the register-transfer level.
[10] proposes a framework for classifying hardware Trojans. In addition, the framework includes
various categories and subcategories that can characterize a Trojan. However, the only categories
relevant to the Structural Checking tool are the Trojan activation and Trojan action. In this thesis,
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these two categories can also be called a Trojan trigger and a Trojan payload. Currently, there are
two main ways hardware Trojans can be detected with the tool [11]. The first method uses
matching analysis, while the second method uses assets and asset traces to analyze patterns from
certain hardware Trojans. This thesis work focuses on Trojan detection using the second method.
2.2.2 Trojan Trigger
An essential component of a hardware Trojan is how they are activated. Classifying Trojan
triggers were further explored in [12], where an expanded Trojan taxonomy was proposed based
on [13], and Trojan triggers were classified into different types. In this taxonomy, Trojan triggers
can be broken down between digitally triggered or physically triggered. The Structural Checking
tool can only detect digitally triggered Trojans as the tool analyzes Trojans in RTL designs. One
subtype of digitally triggered trojan that can be detected with the tool is called a time-bomb or
sequentially triggered Trojans, according to [12]. An example of this is a counter that operates
like a regular counter, but once the counter reaches a specific value, the Trojan will be activated.
2.2.3 Trojan Payload
The malicious action being made by the Trojan is called the Trojan payload. According to
[15], the hardware Trojan payload can be broken down into four different types: Denial-of-service,
leak information, change the functionality, and degraded performance. As described by [14], a
Trojan with a denial-of-Service payload prohibits a service from working correctly. A Trojan with
leak information leaks sensitive information through covert channels or overt output interfaces,
like an encryption key. Additionally, a change functionality payload manipulates the original
functionality of the target device to a malicious functionality. Lastly, [14] describes the degraded
performance as a Trojan payload that affects the performance of a device by modifying parameters.
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2.2.4 Trojan Detection
There are two methods for detecting possible Trojan-infested designs using the Structural
Checking tool, as elaborated in [7]. The first method for detecting Trojans is through functionality
matching. In this method, the unknown design is matched through each champion file [9] listed in
a GRL to assign its functionality. After functionality is set, the unknown design will match against
each design in the champion's functionality category. If it matches closest to a GRL entry flagged
with a Trojan, this design will be marked as possible Trojan-infested. The second method is
through asset pattern recognition. As asset patterns consist of connections between signals and
their functionalities, they can yield helpful information that can be used to suggest possible
Trojans.
[11] introduced Trojan detection using the second method. The first Trojan involved using
a timing signal as a Trojan trigger. This Trojan can cause denial-of-service as signals, like set or
reset, can disable pertinent timing signals from a synchronous design. To detect this Trojan, the
asset trace of a timing signal was analyzed. If the asset trace contains SET or RESET assets, it can
be flagged as a possible Trojan. In this thesis, the second Trojan was called a key leak Trojan. This
Trojan utilizes a leaking information payload, which, in this case, is an encryption key. An
encryption key is not meant to be connected to a primary output of the design. Therefore, to detect
this type of Trojan, the tool can identify asset traces that contain the key asset. If that same asset
trace is also connected to an output, that can be flagged as a key leak Trojan.
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3. METHODOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION
3.1 Overview
The current iteration of the tool mainly relies on the first method of Trojan detection
mentioned earlier, which is through matching. This thesis research addresses this issue by
extending the work done in [11], which utilizes the first method of Trojan detection that relies on
asset pattern recognition. This thesis introduces a framework for this method of Trojan detection.
Three Trojans, named Counter Trojan, Power Drain Trojan, and FSM Trojan, respectively, are
implemented and detected using this method.
3.2 Trojan Detection Through Asset Pattern Framework
There are many ways a hardware Trojan can be implemented in soft IPs. Thus,
implementing a Trojan detection for all of them through the use of asset patterns can be difficult
and tedious. It is impractical to analyze every signal’s asset traces in a design. Creating a
framework can be beneficial for tackling this issue. This framework consists of locating the Trojan
in an unknown design first. A Trojan-infested design does not necessarily mean that most circuits
of the design consist of Trojan. Instead, only a tiny portion of the design contains Trojan in order
for it to remain hidden. The hidden Trojan is usually split between a Trojan trigger and a Trojan
payload hidden in separate sections of a design, but sometimes they are also integrated. The
sections of the designs that contain Trojan trigger and payload will then be analyzed for possible
unique asset traces that might only exist in Trojan-infested designs. Depending on the type of
Trojan, these unique asset traces may only be found in either the Trojan trigger section or the
Trojan payload section of the design. If the Trojan is designed in a way that it can provide different
types of payloads, then a unique asset trace may not be found in the Trojan payload section of that
design. This is when it is recommended to analyze the Trojan trigger section of the design instead.
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On the other hand, if the Trojan trigger is not unique, then it is recommended to look for the unique
Trojan asset trace in the Trojan payload section of the design. After identifying these unique asset
patterns, the developer of the SC tool can then add an implementation within the SC tool that
detects these specific asset traces.
3.2.1 Counter Trojan
This Trojan utilizes a counter to deliver its payload. A counter, in general, can be
implemented in multiple ways. A counter can also increment or decrement in different numbers.
However, no matter how a counter is implemented, they all share one similar aspect: they use a
signal that holds the current value of the counter. Usually, if this signal reaches a specific value,
the Trojan payload will be activated. This Trojan can be called a Counter Trojan in this thesis. To
detect this type of Trojan using the asset pattern method, the SC tool can look for signals containing
COUNT assets. This type of asset is only used for signals being used in a counter. Unfortunately,
searching for a counter signal may not be enough to detect a Trojan since the presence of a counter,
in general, is not considered suspicious.
However, many Trojans that utilize counters usually leak essential information out of the
design, such as an encryption key, or modify a signal that holds sensitive data, such as addresses
and memory data. To distinguish this, the tool can then analyze if a signal with the COUNT asset
drives any signals with data-related assets. These data-related assets can be DATA
ENCRYPTION, DATA MEMORY, DATA SENSITIVE, DATA ADDRESSES, or DATA KEY.
This implementation may not guarantee that all signals in these asset patterns will always
accurately detect a Trojan presence. However, it can flag all the designs that hold these conditions.
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3.2.2 Power Drain Trojan
This type of Trojan performs a denial-of-service attack on a device by activating an enable
signal on a Trojan-infested sequential circuit within the design. A sequential circuit can get stuck
on an infinite loop if it is implemented in a certain way and then enabled. As a result, this trojan
can consume power indefinitely. In this type of Trojan, the sequential circuit is the Trojan payload.
In this thesis, this Trojan is called a Power Drain Trojan. Unlike the Counter Trojan, the unique
asset trace exclusive to this Trojan can only be found in the Trojan payload section of the design.
The trigger for this type of Trojan is not unique and can be implemented in different ways. To
detect this Trojan, the tool can check for three conditions. The first condition is to check whether
a signal or set of signals consists of a loop or cycle. This is the first indication that this circuit is
capable of running indefinitely. The second condition is to check if an enable signal activates the
same set of signals. Enable signals can be labeled using ENABLE asset. The enable signal suggests
that it could be the Trojan trigger. Lastly, the third condition is to check if it does not have any
output. This hints that the cycle may not serve any other purpose than running endlessly. Once all
these conditions are met, then it is a good indication that the unknown design contains a Power
Drain Trojan.
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3.2.3 FSM-Triggered Trojan
Adversaries can hide a Trojan inside a Finite State Machine or FSM. This hidden Trojan
can only be executed when the FSM transitions to a specific state activated with a particular
condition. Attackers can insert specific input data in one of the primary input ports of the design.
If the FSM observes this particular input value, it will activate the Trojan-infested state. This type
of Trojan is called an FSM-Triggered Trojan. Similar to the Counter Trojan, the unique asset trace
for this Trojan can be found in the Trojan trigger section of the design, which in this case is a
specific state of the FSM. Usually, only a particular state of the FSM is infested with a Trojan, and
other states of the FSM can still function normally. This Trojan should contain a signal with the
CONTROLLABLE asset. The CONTROLLABLE asset is one of the internal assets that users can
assign to a signal being used in an FSM. In addition, if another signal with a DATA asset is
indirectly driving this signal, this would suggest that a specific input data is activating this FSM
signal. The tool will flag this as a potential FSM-Triggered Trojan if these conditions are met.
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4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Test designs written in VHDL were used as inputs to the tool to evaluate the effectiveness
of the framework in detecting the three new Trojans. Each design is processed by the SC tool.
First, they were parsed by the tool to extract all the relevant signal information from the designs.
Second, a combination of manual and automatic asset assignments was done for all primary signals
for each design. Third, asset filtering was done to filter the asset from each signal into the signals
that it is connected to. Lastly, the matching process was skipped in this experiment since this
research focuses on the use of asset pattern Trojan detection. The last step is to start the Trojan
detection using all the asset pattern information collected from the designs. If the tool detects a
possible Trojan, a list of signals associated with the Trojan will be reported.
4.1 Counter Trojans
To evaluate the implementation of the Trojan detection against the Counter Trojan, a test
design written in VHDL was created from scratch. The test design contains multiple
implementations of counters to evaluate the accuracy of the Trojan detection. Figure 1 below
shows a VHDL process block that represents a simple counter.

Figure 1: Simple counter with Trojan
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In this counter, the data_x signal is a primary input, while the data_leak signal is a primary
output. data_x will keep incrementing by one until it is reset. The Trojan is inserted during the line
“data_leak <= secret_key;." This Trojan is activated when the value of data_x reaches “123”.
Since data_leak is a primary output and is set with the value of the secret key, it is considered
suspicious, and the tool flags this as a possible Trojan. Figure 2 lists the signal that got flagged by
the tool as a potential Trojan. The word before the first colon specifies the signal name and the
second word after the first colon specifies which design file this signal is located.

Figure 2: Signal associated with Trojan
Some adversaries might even attempt to hide a Counter Trojan by making the counter more
complex. Figure 3 below shows a counter that is split into two process blocks.

Figure 3: Another implementation of counter
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This implementation of a counter is separated into two different process blocks. The first
process block consists of the counter signal data_x being incremented, while the second process
block contains the Trojan payload. In addition, two intermediate signals were added between the
counter signal and the primary output signal data_leak. The tool was still able to detect this
implementation of the Counter Trojan since it relies on asset patterns. No matter where the signals
are placed in the design nor if they put as many intermediate signals as they can to separate the
distance between the counter signal and the output signal, the asset trace of the input signal will
still show that it is driving an output signal that contains a DATA ADDRESS asset. Figure 4 shows
the two signals that got flagged for potential Trojan. Besides secret keys, signals that hold address
data are not usually connected to a primary output.

Figure 4: flagged signals from the Counter Trojan

4.2 Power Drain Trojans
Power Drain Trojans are commonly found in sequential circuits. Two simple sequential
circuits were created in the testing VHDL design to assess the Trojan detection for power drain
Trojans. The first circuit is a ring oscillator, and it is shown below.
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Figure 5: Trojan-infested ring oscillator
This ring oscillator consists of three inverters. These inverters are only used within this
process block. This circuit is enabled by a signal called trojan_signal. During the asset assignment,
this signal was assigned to ENABLE asset. To detect this Trojan, the tool should pass the three
conditions for detecting Power Drain Trojans mentioned in the previous section. The first
condition is the existence of a signal with ENABLE asset, which in this case, is the Trojan_enable.
The second condition relies on the presence of a cycle between a set of signals. In this specific ring
oscillator, inverter_2 depends on inverter_1, inverter_3 depends on inverter_1, then inverter_3
loops back to inverter_1. This means that it satisfies the second condition. Lastly, the third
condition states that if the sequential circuit does not have any output. Since the asset pattern in
this circuit can show that the four inverters are not connected with any output signals, it satisfies
the third condition.

Figure 6: Trojan-infested shift register
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Another sequential circuit created to test this power drain Trojan is a simple shift register.
The general purpose of a shift register is to allow the bits of a signal to shift. In Figure 6 above,
intermediate_signal_2 is an internal signal and acts like a shift register. This circuit also contains
an enable signal, thus passing the first condition. The line “intermediate_signal_2 <=
intermediate_signal_2(0) & intermediate_signal_2(10 downto 1);” is recognized by the tool as a
cycle, therefore passing the second condition. Intermediate_signal_2 is not connected with any
primary output; therefore, it finally satisfies the last condition. Figure 7 lists the flagged from both
trojan-infested ring oscillator and shift register

Figure 7: flagged signals with potential Power Drain Trojan

4.3 FSM-Triggered Trojans
To evaluate the effectiveness of the Trojan detection for FSM Trojans, a few designs were
collected from Trust-hub [15] to test the implementation. One of them is RS232-T600, which is a
Trojan-infested communication design that contains a top-level file and two sub-level designs for
its receiver and transmitter components. The current version of the tool only supports VHDL files.
However, the RS232-T600 design was written in Verilog. Therefore, the design was first converted
into VHDL before being parsed by the tool, as shown in Figure 8. The Trojan is hidden within an
FSM under the transmitter component.
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Figure 8: Trojan-infested FSM from RS232-T600

In this specific Trojan, the payload is activated when the FSM observes specific sequence
inputs. Once the FSM transitions to the last state, it will trigger the Trojan, which will ultimately
cause a leak information attack. If the Trojan detection observes a signal with the
CONTROLLABLE asset, it will then analyze its asset trace for all the signals that drive this signal.
Since the asset pattern for this design shows that the state_DataSend signal is set with a
CONTROLLABLE asset, it will then check if it is being driven by any signals that contain any
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assets from the DATA asset category. Finally, the tool will then report all the signals associated
with this potential Trojan. There are two rec_datah and xmit_data_h listed in Figure 9 since both
were used in multiple design files.

Figure 9: Flagged signals from RS232-T600
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5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Hardware Trojan has become an important security threat to IC vendors incorporating
third-party IPs. Therefore, detecting these Trojan earlier in the IC design flow is critical. There are
two existing methods of Trojan detection for the Structural Checking tool. The first method is
functionality, which compares an unknown soft IP design to a list of trusted designs in the Golden
Reference Library to see whether it matches closely with a Trojan-free or a Trojan-infested design.
The second method of Trojan detection uses the concept of asset patterns, which is done by
analyzing an unknown design to determine if it contains a unique asset pattern commonly found
in Trojan-infested designs. Much of the research done to improve the Structural Checking tool
mainly focused on the functionality matching method. This thesis research expanded on the other
method of Trojan detection. A framework was developed to help future researchers identify the
unique asset patterns hidden in Trojan-infested designs so that they can implement the proper
detection for those Trojans. In addition, three Trojan detection examples were introduced using
this framework.
Many future works can be done to improve the framework introduced in this thesis. The
idea of Trojan detection using asset patterns relies on signals having been assigned with proper
assets. However, the current asset assignment implemented in the tool is mainly tailored for
external signals. There are limited ways an internal signal can be assigned with assets. For
example, some implementation of the Counter Trojan consists of mostly internal signals. Because
of this, those internal signals cannot be assigned with a COUNT asset, which is a crucial part of
detecting a Trojan using asset patterns. Another limitation is that many Trojan-infested designs
were written in Verilog, and by the time this thesis was written, the tool’s Verilog support has not
been completed yet. Because of this, there are limited testing designs used in this research; thus,
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accuracy is not the main focus of this research. However, the three Trojan detections introduced
in this thesis can be improved once more testing designs becomes available to be parsed by the
tool.
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